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Introduction
On November 22, 2014, Officer Timothy Loehmann tragically shot
and killed Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old boy, in Cleveland, Ohio.1 The
1.

See Christine Mai-Duc, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Had Been
Deemed Unfit for Duty, L.A. Times (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:38 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-cleveland-tamir-rice-timothyloehmann-20141203-story.html [https://perma.cc/T5NU-KLU3] (providing
a brief description of the events surrounding Tamir Rice’s death and the
employment history of Officer Loehmann); see also Roger A. Clark,
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Cuyahoga County prosecutor declined to recommend charges against
Loehmann for the shooting.2 What was lost in the story surrounding
this tragic death was not the fact that Officer Loehmann should have
faced charges, but that he should not have been employed as a
Cleveland police officer in the first place. When looking at his previous
stint as a police officer, it becomes clear that he was not only unfit to
serve and protect the community of Cleveland, but that he should have
been prohibited from serving as a police officer anywhere.
In 2012, Loehmann served in the Independence Police Department,
only thirteen miles south of Cleveland, for five months.3 During the first
four months, he trained in the Cleveland Heights Police Academy.4
Personnel records from his time in Independence show that by December of 2012, the Independence Police Department began internal proceedings to fire Loehmann.5 According to the records, he had exhibited
a pattern of emotional instability, immaturity, and an inability to follow basic instructions during firearms training at the Academy.6 Before
the Independence Police Department fired him, however, Loehmann
resigned citing personal reasons.7
Expert Reporting on the Shooting Death of Tamir Rice (2015),
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2623274-roger-clark-expertreport.html [https://perma.cc/K4VP-CFNY] (discussing, at length, Clark’s
reasoning behind his finding that “[Loehmann’s] shooting of Tamir Rice was
inconsistent with generally accepted standards and norms in police practices
and that it was an unreasonable and unjustified use of deadly force.”).
2.

Timothy Williams and Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face
Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleve
land.html [https://perma.cc/U9D5-D88W].

3.

Mai-Duc, supra note 1.

4.

Id.

5.

Id. Officer Loehmann’s personnel files show that Loehmann displayed
disregard for department regulations, insubordination, and a lack of
commitment. City of Independence, Ohio Personnel File of Timothy
Loehmann, at 56–59, available online at https://www.scribd.com/doc/
252024886/Independence-PD-Timothy-Loehmann-Records#fullscreen&
from_embed [https://perma.cc/H84B-LXRR] [hereinafter Loehmann
Personnel File].

6.

Mai-Duc, supra note 1; see Loehmann Personnel File, supra note 5, at 55
(“[D]uring a state [shooting] range qualification course, Ptl. Loehmann was
distracted and weepy . . . could not follow simple directions . . . and his
handgun performance was dismal.”).

7.

Mai-Duc, supra note 1; see Loehmann Personel File, supra note 5, at 58–59
(“I advised him of my intent and reasons [for firing him], and Ptl. Loehmann
decided to resign instead for personal reasons. I accepted his written
resignation.”).
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When the Cleveland Police Department hired Loehmann, it did so
without examining his personnel records from Independence as part of
its background check.8 When the hiring officers called the Independence
human resources department, the director did not disclose the issues
that led to Loehmann’s resignation.9 A cursory glance through
Loehmann’s personnel records, however, would have shown the hiring
officers that he had displayed a disturbing lack of maturity.10 In fact,
Loehmann’s direct supervisor and Independence Deputy Chief of Police
James Polak said, “I do not believe time, nor training, will be able to
change or correct these deficiencies.”11 After resigning from Independence, Loehmann attempted to secure employment at four other
police departments.12 Each police department rejected Loehmann before
Cleveland hired him.13 How, then, did these four police departments
know not to hire him when Cleveland did not?
Tragically, this is an oft-repeated problem across the United States.
In 2004, Sean Sullivan, a police officer in Oregon, was barred from a
future career as a police officer as part of his sentence for kissing a tenyear-old girl on the mouth.14 Three months later, Cedar Vale, Kansas
hired him as their police chief. He was later investigated for an alleged
sexual relationship with an underage girl.15 Sullivan was eventually
convicted of burglary and criminal conspiracy.16 Officer Eddie Boyd III
resigned from the St. Louis Police Department after two incidents: he
struck a twelve-year-old girl with his gun in 2006; and, after doing the
8.

Mai-Duc, supra note 1.

9.

Id.

10.

Loehmann Personnel File, supra note 5, at 59.

11.

Id. at 58. Loehmann listed James Polak as his direct supervisor. Cuyahoga
County Application for Employment, Timothy Loehmann, at 3, available
online at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1391683-applicationresume-01062015163324-redacted.html#document/ [https://perma.cc/E9Q
U-F2SR].

12.

James Downie, Tamir Rice Case Is a Perversely Fitting End to a Year of
Police Controversies, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-a-12-year-old-boy-is-killed-by-police-andno-one-is-accountable/2015/12/31/6970e528-afbd-11e5-b820-eea4d64be2a1_
story.html?utm_term=.7995e4d54ed6 [https://perma.cc/5C7R-9HL4].

13.

Id.

14.

Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in Other
Cities, N.Y. Times (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
09/11/us/whereabouts-of-cast-out-police-officers-other-cities-often-hire-them.
html [https://perma.cc/45ME-U88B].

15.

Id.

16.

Id.
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same to a young boy in 2007, he falsified the subsequent police report.17
Officer Boyd, now with the Ferguson Police Department, is the subject
of a lawsuit stemming from an incident in which he allegedly arrested
a woman who asked for his name after a traffic accident.18
In the 1990s—at the height of the unrest following the Rodney King
beating—the mayors of Los Angeles and New York City created
commissions to investigate police department corruption and misconduct.19 The Christopher Commission of Los Angeles and the Mollen
Commission of New York City discovered widespread issues of corruption, racial profiling, excessive use of force, and other forms of police
misconduct.20 They also discovered an appalling lack of intradepartmental accountability.21 In the nearly two decades since these commissions, much has been said about what must be done to prevent “bad
apple” police officers from leaving one jurisdiction to serve in another.
Unfortunately, little progress has been made in implementing effective
responses to this most pressing of issues.
The middle part of the 1990s was marked by heightened public
scrutiny of police-community relations, brought on by the Rodney King
beating and the Christopher and Mollen Commissions. As a result, during the 104th Congress, Representative Harry Johnston and Senator
Bob Graham, both of Florida, introduced bills that would have rendered this discussion moot. The Law Enforcement and Correctional
Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996 would have amended the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to create a

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department,
Report (1991) [hereinafter Christopher Commission Report]; The
City of New York Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the
Police Department, Anatomy of Failure: A Path for Success
(Commission Report) (1994) [hereinafter Mollen Commission Report].

20.

See Christopher Commission Report, supra note 19, at vii–xxiii
(providing a detailed summary of findings, including those on excessive use
of force, racism and bias, and structural issues); Mollen Commission
Report, supra note 19, at 1–10 (providing a detailed summary of findings
on police corruption issues within the NYPD).

21.

For a discussion on the lack of accountability of individual officers who often
face no repercussions for their actions, and of commanding officers who,
through the structure of the LAPD and of Los Angeles city government,
receive little oversight, see Chapters 9 and 10 of the Christopher
Commission Report, supra note 19, at 151–221. For a closer look at how
corruption permeated the NYPD’s internal investigation division, see
Chapter 4 of the Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at 70–89.
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national clearinghouse for law enforcement employment data.22 The
findings section of both versions of the act explained why a clearinghouse was needed: “[T]here have been numerous documented cases of
officers who have obtained officer employment and certification in a
State after revocation of officer certification or dishonorable discharge
in another State.”23
The clearinghouse, overseen by the Department of Justice, would
have listed all previous employment in law enforcement agencies, for all
law enforcement officers.24 Under the Act, every applicant for a law enforcement position, including those positions within police departments—both elected and appointed—and state correctional facilities,
would have been required to fill out an authorization for release of records during the application process.25 The records would include the applicant’s name, date of birth, Social Security number, and other vital
information, as well as whether the person’s state law enforcement certification had been revoked.26 The Act also allowed for immunity from
civil liability for disclosure by officers or departments that, in good
faith, complied with the provisions of the bill.27
Both bills never made it past committee.28 During a hearing on the
House version of the bill, then Representative Charles Schumer outlined
many of the criticism that these bills faced. Along with many others,
he thought that the database would be an invasion of officers’ privacy,
and that it was an unnecessary solution to a non-existent problem.29 He
also criticized the broad overreach that the bill presented: “When we’re
concerned only about so-called rogue officers, why not just list the few
bad officers?”30 Another criticism, from the National Troopers Coali22.

S. 484, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 3263, 104th Cong. (1996).

23.

S. 484 § 2; H.R. 3263 § 2.

24.

S. 484 § 3; H.R. 3263 § 3.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

H.R. 3263 (104th): Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment
Registration Act of 1996, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/104/hr3263 [https://perma.cc/E4KS-TG3U] (last visited Mar. 14,
2017); S. 484 (104th): Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers
Employment Registration Act of 1995, GovTrack, https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s484 [https://perma.cc/DQQ6-7KP6] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2017).

29.

Police Officers’ Rights and Benefits: Hearing on H.R. 218, H.R. 878, H.R.
1805, H.R. 2912 and H.R. 3263 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 37 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer).

30.

Id.
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tion, was the uncertainty regarding the confidentiality of the information provided to the database.31 Further issues were raised about the
procedural due process rights of police officers.32 This mainly took the
form of concerns regarding whether an officer would have notice of what
information would be reported and whether an officer would have the
right to appeal the information that appears on his or her disciplinary
record.33
Not all police organizations opposed the bill, though. In fact, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) was the first to
urge Representative Johnston to introduce the bill.34 Though the IACP
had reservations, particularly in ensuring that each state would provide
due process to officers if their licenses were revoked, it supported the
bill because of its benefit to smaller jurisdictions.35 Sheriffs from police
departments across the county also wrote or testified in favor of the
bill. Their reason for supporting the bill mirrored that of the IACP: the
relative lack of funding that smaller police departments have to carry
out background checks.36 Further, James T. Moore, the Commissioner
of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, specifically discussed
the weakness of background checks in discovering officer misconduct
committed in the employ of out-of-state police departments.37
Unfortunately, this support was insufficient.
Once again, the highly volatile nature of police-community relations
has placed this issue in the public spotlight. Two potential solutions
have been proffered that would ameliorate this issue. The database legislation discussed above is one such solution.38 The other posits to

31.

Id. at 87–88 (statement of James A. Rhinebarger, Chairman, National
Troopers Coalition).

32.

Id. at 110–11 (responses of Gilbert G. Gallegos, National President of the
Fraternal Order of Police, to questions from Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee of
Texas).

33.

Id. at 112 (statement of William J. Johnson, General Counsel, National
Association of Police Organizations, Inc.).

34.

Id. at 145 (statement of Roy C. Kime, Legislative Counsel, International
Association of Chiefs of Police).

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 118 (statement of Patrick Sullivan, Jr., Sheriff of Arapahoe County,
Colorado).

37.

Id. at 174 (prepared statement of James T. Moore, Comm’r of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement).

38.

In 2009, the Department of Justice gave a $200,000 grant to the International
Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training
(“IADLEST”) to create a database for the purposes of tracking decertified
officers. The Department of Justice no longer funds the initiative, and the
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persuade states to enact a model decertification law. Much has been
written on what that legislation would look like.39 This Note proposes
a different solution—one which is a combination of previous ideas, but
which would take further steps to strengthen accountability. Rather
than allowing the states to enact minimum standards for officers, Congress should enact legislation that requires the Department of Justice
to promulgate minimum standards for police officers. The Department
of Justice should have the power to persuade, but not coerce, states to
enact these minimum standards. The federal government, through the
Department of Justice, should also create a database, similar to the one
discussed above, that would store the employment data, reported by
the states, of officers who have had their certification revoked or suspended. This type of legislation would be constructed similarly to the
Clean Air Act: state agencies would be responsible for enacting and
enforcing these standards on state and local police departments. The
Department of Justice would only be involved when a state or local
police department declines to enact or properly enforce the standards.
This Note will delve into how this type of system will overcome any
barriers to implementation and how the ideal system would operate.
director of the IADLEST complained that a lack of resources prevented
IADLEST from keeping up with problem officers. Williams, supra note 14.
39.

In the last three decades, Roger Goldman, of the St. Louis University School
of Law, and Steven Puro, of the St. Louis University Department of Political
Science, have written extensively on the use of decertification as a means of
solving the police misconduct issue. See Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro,
Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police
Misconduct?, 45 St. Louis U. L.J. 541, 575, 577–78 (2001) [hereinafter
Revocation] (discussing the Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers
Employment Registration Act, and the alternative possibility of persuading
states to adopt programs that would ensure state agencies share data to
prevent law enforcement officers from crossing state lines for new
employment); see also Roger L. Goldman, A Model Decertification Law, 32
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 147 (2012) [hereinafter Model Law] (providing
an example of a model decertification law); Roger L. Goldman & Steven
Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional Remedies for
Police Misconduct, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 45, 52–64 (1987) [hereinafter
Alternative Remedies] (examining the shortcomings of remedies such as the
exclusionary rule, criminal prosecutions against law enforcement officers, and
administrative complaints); Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law
Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and Federal Criminal Prosecution: An
Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 121
(2003) [hereinafter Cooperative Federalism] (urging federal prosecutors to
explore state decertification, rather than litigation, as a means of punishing
officers who have committed crimes); Steven Puro, Roger L. Goldman &
William C. Smith, Police Decertification: Changing Patterns Among the
States, 1985–1995, 20 Policing: An Int’l J. Police Strategies &
Mgmt. 481 (1997) (depicting a research study on the evolution of police
decertification in states).

1265

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4
A Reform to Police Department Hiring

Part I will explore the various types of misconduct that must be included in this system, including criminal convictions, firings due to misconduct, and resignations in the face of imminent discipline or investigation. It also will consider certain infractions by officers that should
be included, but that have serious hurdles to effective tracking which
militate against inclusion in the system. Part II will discuss the current
lack of accountability in law enforcement hiring decisions. This discussion will include attention to the current challenges—legal, political,
and cultural—that may, and often do, impede the implementation of
this system. Part III will review what provisions would be appropriate
for the legislation. It will examine what types of law enforcement officers should be included; the minimum standards of conduct that, if
breached, would require law enforcement agencies to report the breach;
the protections afforded law enforcement officers; and the incentives for
state and local compliance.

I. Police Misconduct Defined
Police misconduct and the attempts to remedy it have existed for
decades. Identifying and preventing police misconduct through police
department reform was one of the goals of the President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, formed by
President Johnson in 1965.40 While police misconduct has been a part
of the public discourse in the past, it became and has remained, a larger
part of the conversation in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating
in Los Angeles. The Christopher Commission, created amid the resulting public outcry, raised a series of questions relating to police misconduct.41 The Commission paid particular attention to the culture within
the Los Angeles Police Department, the failure to penalize officers with
repeated instances of misconduct, and the failure to flag potentially violent applicants during the hiring process.42 Questions also were raised
about the efficacy of background investigations conducted by an overburdened hiring department.43 The Commission noted that, while some
applicants were rejected due to previous instances of misconduct, background checks that indicated an applicant’s history of violence were
overlooked.44
40.

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society vi (1967)
available online at, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://
perma.cc/23MS-W2TN].

41.

Christopher Commission Report, supra note 19, at 17.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at xvi.

44.

Id. at xv–xvi.
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Police misconduct, though, is often hard to define. It certainly encompasses criminal activity and corruption, but what of the police activity that may be wrong, but does not necessarily rise to a level that
results in termination? While the optimal system would track all instances of police misconduct, regardless of level, the systems that this
Note aims to create would, at the very least, track criminal convictions,
firings due to misconduct, and resignations in the face of imminent
discipline. Police misconduct, then, should be defined as criminal activety, corruption, and abuse of power. And though impractical to enforce
or track, the ideal system would pay special attention to an officer’s
demonstrated instances of racial profiling, implicit bias, and selective
enforcement of laws due to the color of one’s skin, religion, sexual and
gender identity, and mental capacity and illness.
A. Criminal Activity

Police officers, themselves tasked with investigating and preventing
criminal activity, perpetrate crimes at a higher rate than one would
think given their status as community protectors. Criminal activity of
police officers encompasses a wide range of crimes motivated by varying
factors. As the people tasked with protecting and serving communities,
police officers must be law-abiding citizens and should be held to the
same standards as other professionals, such as teachers and doctors,
where certain convictions can preclude one from employment.
Currently, there exists no nationwide reporting service for crimes committed by law enforcement officers and this presents a serious issue.
For the purposes of this Note, criminal activity is defined as actions
that can lead to a criminal conviction. Sex-related, drug-and-alcoholrelated, violence-related, and profit-related crimes are included in this
category, as are forms of criminal corruption and perjury.45 A recent
study, funded and published by the Department of Justice and carried
out by researchers at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, found
alarming trends in the limited data that the researchers used.46 By using
an algorithm through the Google News search engine, the researchers
were able to uncover 6,724 instances where police officers were arrested
for various criminal activities between 2005 and 2011.47 The researchers
recognized that this data set is limited due to the lack of available
reporting resources, and thus does not include all police officers who
may have engaged in criminal activity nationwide.48
45.

Philip Matthew Stinson, Sr. et al., Police Integrity Lost: A Study
of Law Enforcement Officers Arrested 15 (2016).

46.

Id.

47.

Id. at 20–21.

48.

Id. at 19–21.
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Sex-related crimes often involve an officer abusing his or her authority, and typically involve violent sexual misconduct perpetrated
against young victims.49 Sex-related crimes were the third-largest category, with 1,475 cases involving just 1,070 law enforcement officers.50
This clearly depicts a grave issue of repeat offenders, such as Sean
Sullivan, who had at least two instances of inappropriate sexual contact
with a minor.51 In fact, minor victims, like Officer Sullivan’s two victims, comprised almost half of the 1,475 cases in the study.52 Nearly
one-third of cases involved some form of rape, either statutory or
forcible.53 Preventing applicants with a history of sex-related crimes is
of the utmost importance for protecting the most vulnerable members
of the population.
Alcohol-related crimes, particularly driving under the influence, are
very common in police departments across the country.54 Many of the
DUI arrests, however, were only carried out in extreme instances: traffic
accidents, injuries, and fatalities.55 The researchers categorized these arrests as officers who had “lost their exemption from law enforcement.”56
When officers are stopped for simple DUI offenses, which do not involve
injury, fatality, or property damage, they often are not arrested because
of their status as a fellow law enforcement official.57 According to the
study, even if the officer was arrested for an alcohol-related offense, little more than one-third lost their jobs.58 This speaks to the need for reporting of all instances of misconduct, regardless of whether the officer
was disciplined.
Drug-related crimes are often entwined with profit-motivated
crimes due to the nature of the drug trade.59 More than half of drug-related arrests could be categorized as profit-motivated as well.60 Thus,
49.

Id. at 23.

50.

Id. at 22.

51.

Williams, supra note 14.

52.

Stinson, et al., supra note 45, at 23.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at 24.

56.

Id. at 23.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 24. Only 270 of the 1,405 incidents resulted in the department firing
the officer. Of the remainder, 263 cases involved an officer voluntarily
resigning, 612 involved officer suspensions, and in 260 incidents the officer
did not face punishment. Id. at 124.

59.

Id. at 24.

60.

Id.
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drug-related crimes related to personal use were not as prevalent as
those related to trafficking, enabling the drug trade, and shakedowns
of drug dealers.61 These crimes do have a slight overlap with corruption,
most notably self-dealing and extortion. There is far less data on drugrelated crimes and hiring, however. Mandatory reporting of all drugrelated activity would open up police departments and give more information for background check purposes.
Violence-related crimes were far and away the most prevalent offenses found in the study.62 Violence-related crimes seem to go hand in
hand with being a police officer, as the sheer number of excessive-useof-force cases reported in the media show. But a significant amount of
violence-related crimes are unrelated to use of force during an arrest.
Nearly one-third of violence-related crime arrests during this period
were for domestic violence.63 And, as the report indicates, many of these
domestic violence arrests and convictions did not result in firings.64 The
Gun Control Act of 196865 provides that persons convicted of domesticviolence crimes face the prospect of losing the right to own a firearm.66
Thus, the fact that officers can avoid criminal penalties for domesticviolence crimes gives rise to questions regarding those officers’ continued use of weapons.67
Profit-motivated crime arrests, though presenting an overlap with
various forms of corruption such as extortion, were the second-highest
category in the study.68 Excepting those forms of profit-motivated
crimes that do overlap with corruption, serious questions are still raised
by the varying crimes of theft from persons, robbery, or theft from
buildings or businesses.69 But profit-motivated crimes do not always

61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 22.

63.

Id. at 24.

64.

Only 210 of 961 incidents resulted in an officer losing his job as a result of a
domestic violence arrest or conviction. Of the remainder, 150 voluntarily
resigned, 453 were suspended, and 148 did not face any known adverse
employment decisions. Id. at 152.

65.

18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012).

66.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (making it unlawful for persons convicted of domestic
violence crimes to own a firearm).

67.

Stinson et al., supra note 45, at 25. Originally, the Gun Control Act of
1968 contained an exception for law enforcement officers to use firearms
while on the job. With the passage of the “Lautenberg Amendment,”
however, the exception was removed. Revocation, supra note 39, at 555–56.

68.

Stinson et al., supra note 45, at 22.

69.

Id. at 25.
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result in job loss, just as the other forms of crimes do not.70 The largest
chance for job loss relating to profit-motivated crimes occurs when the
crime is also drug-related.71 Just as above, profit-motivated crimes
should be included in this system.
Police officers who commit crimes are acting conversely to the fundamental duties of law enforcement officials: the duties to protect and
serve the community. Rather than upholding these duties, officers are
taking advantage of their position and acting as if they are above the
law. Therefore, the system this Note proposes needs to work with police
departments to ensure that even officers who are privately sanctioned,
as opposed to publicly disciplined through suspension or termination,
are still reported to the database so that future police departments are
made fully aware of an officer’s disciplinary issues.
B. Corruption

Corruption, though still a crime, can be much less visible to the
public than those crimes listed above. As such, corruption investigations are often kept within the department and are tracked at a much
lower rate. Corruption is a dereliction of duty itself, as officers are sworn
to uphold the law. But a culture of corruption also spawns misconduct
in other forms; if a police officer is likely to lie on the stand or file a
false police report, then what else is the officer likely to do? Corruption,
for the purposes of this Note, is defined as perjury, falsification of documents, cover-ups, and extortion. Corruption in police departments is
much harder to define and weed out than other criminal activity, and
this system must require police departments to self-report.
Lying while under oath, or perjury, is common enough in police departments that a new word was coined for the practice: “testilying.”72
Testilying has been uncovered in large cities all across the country, and
its rampant occurrence has fractured public trust in the police.73 A police officer’s lie can have serious, lasting consequences.74 It can lead to
innocent persons being convicted of crimes they did not commit, and

70.

Profit-motivated cases, however, do result in job loss more frequently than
other crimes; of 1,592 cases, 577 resulted in involuntary termination, 503
resulted in voluntary resignation, 376 resulted in suspension, and 133
resulted in no adverse action. Id. at 167.

71.

Id. at 25.

72.

Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at 36.

73.

Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence
of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 233, 234–37 (1998).

74.

Id. at 237.
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guilty persons freely walking away.75 Police perjury can be motivated
by malice, but it can also be motivated by a desire to admit evidence
obtained in violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights.76 The “Blue
Wall of Silence,” the protective and secretive police code that prohibits
disclosing a fellow officer’s perjury, presents many challenges, and is
another reason police officers will lie or refuse to testify.77 Despite the
difficulty in determining whether an officer has “testilied”—in part due
to the “Blue Wall of Silence”—society must ensure that these officers
are not able to obtain new employment in a law enforcement capacity.
Falsification of documents related to an investigation is another serious problem within police departments. The Mollen Commission uncovered widespread falsification of police reports, often to protect the
arresting officer, to cover up unlawful searches and seizures, or to frame
an innocent civilian.78 Like testilying, the falsification of documents related to an investigation hurts police-community relations. And, like
testilying, the “Blue Wall of Silence” often makes the issue worse by
covering up falsification.79 This is especially so because investigators
and prosecutors are unlikely to follow up on reports made by the community and, at times, ignore differing reports from the public, characterizing the witness as “involved.”80 While it is difficult to say what evidence would be necessary to decertify an officer for falsification of documents, it is clear that the issue must be addressed.
Cover-ups are closely tied to perjury and falsification of documents,
as they are the main ways in which cover-ups occur. One solution to
the “Blue Wall of Silence” could be the addition of a category in the
system that tracks officers who do not break with the “Blue Wall of Silence” to report misconduct. While this might be a lower-level “offense”
for the purposes of these systems, this could be a direct response to the
culture of police departments and unions. It could present serious challenges as well. As it stands, police officers who do break the “Blue Wall

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

See Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at 36–43 (discussing these
forms of corruption within the NYPD).

79.

Chin & Wells, supra note 73, at 237–41.

80.

See Christopher Commission Report, supra note 19, at 162–64, for a
discussion of the LAPD’s classification system for witnesses to police
misconduct. Often, internal investigators would cheat the system by labeling
non-involved witnesses as “interested” solely because the witness made a
complaint against the officer. Id. at 163.
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of Silence” code often experience threats of violence, expulsion, and
potential job loss.81
Extortion is another common form of police corruption.82 While it
generally affects citizens engaged in criminal activity, such as drug
dealing, illegal gambling, or prostitution,83 it is just as important to
track as the other forms of corruption. Extortion shows a propensity
for criminal activity, and often targets more vulnerable segments of the
population: people who might only be involved in these criminal activities as a last resort or because they are forced into the activities.84
Police officers who engage in extortion present dangers to the public.
Rather than protecting vulnerable citizens, officers often take money,
sex, or drugs in exchange for not arresting citizens engaged in criminal
activity. This has many serious consequences; it allows criminal activity
to perpetuate, endangers the most vulnerable members of society, and
leads to more danger for law-abiding citizens.
Corruption, though more private than the criminal activity discussed above, is no less important to track. Corruption breeds an environment that is relaxed on crime and enforcement, while being protective of those officers who do engage in misconduct. It takes the form of
officers who do not arrest other officers for DUI and of officers who are
willing to protect other officers at the expense of the citizens they are
sworn to protect and serve. While the system will have to rely on a
modicum of self-reporting, the release of documents related to internal
investigations will be a powerful tool for either system.
C. Unconstitutional Activities

Over the past two decades, the Department of Justice has entered
into consent decrees with police departments all across the country.
Beginning with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, the Department of Justice was authorized to investigate any
non-federal law enforcement agencies for suspected civil rights violations under 34 U.S.C. 12601.85 Since then, consent decrees have been
81.

Chin & Wells, supra note 73, at 241–44. In one instance, New York City
gave an armed detail to two officers who had testified against other officers
because the city feared violent retaliation by police officers. Id. at 243–44.

82.

See Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at ex. 6, 4–8 (finding that
the corruption had evolved from simply accepting briberies to actively
extorting criminals).

83.

Id.

84.

See id. at ex. 6, 4–5.

85.

Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/conduct-law-enforcement-agencies [https://
perma.cc/FC9L-E9PU] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); 34 U.S.C. 12601 (2017)
(formerly 42 U.S.C. 14141).
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entered into with police departments in Pittsburgh, Washington D.C.,
Los Angeles, New Jersey, Oakland, Detroit, New Orleans, Seattle,
Ferguson, and Cleveland, with further oversight taking place in
Cincinnati, New York, and Baltimore.86 These investigations have
turned up widespread constitutional violations within each police department. Violations include unconstitutional stop and frisks, searches
and seizures, and excessive use of force.87
The investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department is the
most recent investigation that the Department of Justice has released
to the public. The Department found that the Baltimore police officers
were stopping law-abiding citizens at an alarming rate, often when the
citizens were not participating in any criminal activity.88 Officers frequently were using false pretenses, and not acting on any reasonable
suspicion, to stop citizens in order to find evidence of criminal activity.89
Similarly, the stop-and-frisk policy in New York City, which was similar
to policies employed in other jurisdictions,90 was ruled unconstitutional
in part because of the unreasonable, racially motivated nature of the
stops in the first place.91 Police officers who are caught engaging in, or
upper-level command officers who are caught enacting policies that result in, a pattern of unreasonable stop and frisks,92 therefore, should be
included in this system.
86.

Police Reform and Accountability Accomplishments, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925861/download [https://perma.cc/DK
9X-QAXY] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); Police Exec. Res. F., Civil
Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned 1–5 (2013),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/civil%20ri
ghts%20investigations%20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%
202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/662A-V5QH].

87.

E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the Baltimore City
Police Department 3 (2016) [hereinafter Baltimore Report].

88.

See id. at 24–34 (detailing the Baltimore police department’s unconstitutional
practices).

89.

Id.

90.

Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Judge Scheindlin found that officers conducted a substantial amount of stops
on citizens of color, even in areas of the cities that were not heavily populated
by people of color. This is very similar to what the Department of Justice
found in Baltimore, Chicago, and Ferguson. See, e.g., Baltimore Report,
supra note 87, at 48–54; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the
Chicago Police Department 19, 143–45 (2016) [hereinafter Chicago
Report]; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department 64–67 (2015) [hereinafter Ferguson Report].

91.

Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 665–66.

92.

While there exists little publicly available data on individual officers’ use of
unconstitutional and unreasonable stop-and-frisks, there exists some data on
broad trends. See Becca James, Stop and Frisk in 4 Cities: The Importance
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Searches and seizures of property are unconstitutional when law enforcement officials conduct them without a warrant or without probable
cause in exigent circumstances.93 There are significant social and legal
interests in preventing police officers from conducting unconstitutional
searches and seizures. Prosecutors do not want evidence that could convict a defendant when it results from an unconstitutional search that
could subject the evidence to the exclusionary rule.94 And privacy interests for the general public outweigh any benefit that an unconstitutional
search and seizure might allow.95 This is especially true because of the
exclusionary rule. Thus, police officers who have a history of repeated
unconstitutional searches of property should be held accountable by
this system.
Under the Fourth Amendment, citizens have the right to be free
from a law enforcement officer’s use of excessive or deadly force without
justification. As the Department of Justice investigations demonstrate,
law enforcement officers violate this right in a widespread and rampant
of Police Data, Sunlight Foundation (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/02/stop-and-frisk-in-4-cities-theimportance-of-open-police-data-2/ [https://perma.cc/4NQ6-UXPL]. Many
police departments—though some better than others—keep internal records
of stop-and-frisks, including the names of those officers who employ the
tactic. Id. The Sunlight Foundation is a non-profit entity dedicated to
government accountability. About Us, Sunlight Foundation, https://
sunlightfoundation.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/2XN2-VCFU] (last visited
Mar. 17, 2017).
93.

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that “[a]bsent
exigent circumstances, [the entrance of a household] may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant.”).

94.

The exclusionary rule is a court-created remedy, couched in the Fourth
Amendment, that grants protection to property owners who are subject to
unconstitutional searches. Evidence obtained during an unconstitutional
search can be suppressed later, thus significantly damaging a prosecutor’s
ability to try a case. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule, but applying it only to the federal
government); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–60 (1961) (holding that the
exclusionary rule is incorporated against the states). Since then, the Supreme
Court has carved out many exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and now,
the exclusionary rule acts as a balancing test. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (“[B]ecause the [exclusionary] rule is
prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be
applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social
costs.’”) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)); see also
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); Utah v. Strieff, 1036 S. Ct.
2056, 2061 (2016).

95.

See William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Remedy, 88 Geo. L. J. 799, 832–40 (2000) (discussing privacy
interests in the context of Weeks and beyond).
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manner.96 The victims are often people of color, occasionally those with
mental illness, and these violations are a contributing cause to the fracturing of police-community relations.97 Unfortunately, police departments and state governments do little to prevent these constitutional
violations. Often, civilian complaints are ignored or filed incorrectly.98
And even when an investigation moves forward against an officer, the
protections that the officer gets through his or her union or through the
“Blue Wall of Silence” mean that the officer rarely is disciplined.99 The
ideal minimum standards for this system would include some method
of penalizing an officer’s career when that officer engages in repeated
instances of use of excessive or deadly force without justification.
D. Racial Profiling and Bias

Racial profiling and bias should be included as a minimum standard
for decertification or revocation. The difficulty in using racial profiling,
however, is determining whether an officer actually uses racial profiling
and bias when carrying out his or her duties. While the investigation
in Ferguson revealed that officers had exchanged racially charged messages with each other,100 not every case is so blatant. Unless an officer
uses explicitly racial motives for effecting a stop or arrest, racial bias
and profiling might only surface after extensive discovery of internal
documents and policies. And as I will discuss later, the Supreme Court
often sanctions police policies that have a disparate impact on people
of color. While the ideal minimum standards would include some manner of decertification for racial profiling and bias, it is only included
here as a potential future instrument for determining unfitness for duty.
Racial profiling, implicit and explicit bias, and selective enforcement of laws are damaging policies that sour police-community relations. These policies affect all people of color; many surveys have found
that a majority of people of color disagree with the notion that they are
96.

See, e.g., Baltimore Report, supra note 87, at 74–115 (examining the
Baltimore City Police Department’s use of force tactics and policies);
Chicago Report, supra note 90, at 22–46 (examining the same with the
Chicago Police Department); Ferguson Report, supra note 90, at 28–41
(examining the same with the Ferguson Police Department).

97.

Baltimore Report, supra note 87, at 47, 80; Ferguson Report, supra
note 90, at 28.

98.

See, e.g., Baltimore Report, supra note 87, at 139–48 (discussing the
Baltimore police department’s obstruction of investigations and lack of
oversight); Chicago Report, supra note 90, at 50–62 (discussing the
Chicago police department’s obstruction of investigations into police
misconduct); Ferguson Report, supra note 90, at 82–86 (discussing the
Ferguson police department’s inadequate complaints process).

99.

See generally infra Section II.B.

100. Ferguson Report, supra note 90, at 72.
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treated as fairly as white citizens.101 African Americans and Latin Americans make up a disproportionate share of stops by law enforcement
officers, such that the terms “driving-while-Black or -Brown” and
“walking-while-Black or -Brown” have become ubiquitous as criticisms
for police policies.102 In fact, studies have shown that African Americans,
Latin Americans, and Asian Americans are stopped as much as “eight
to ten times as often” as are white Americans.103
The high number of stops is not indicative of a higher level of crime,
though. Data from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration shows that white Americans use drugs such as crack
and powder cocaine at similar rates, and other drugs such as hallucinogens, heroin, and stimulants at higher rates than African Americans.104 From the early 1990s through 2007, the proportion of African
Americans arrested for drugs has never dropped below three times the
proportion of white Americans arrested for drugs.105 And the years
between 1988 and 1993 saw rates of drug arrests for African Americans
more than five times that of drug arrests for white Americans.106 Race,
then, seems to be the factor that explains this discrepancy the most.
The judicial system complicates this matter. The Supreme Court
often strengthens privacy and personal protections for white citizens,
while weakening them for citizens of color. Illinois v. Wardlow,107 decided in 2000, allows officers to label drug-dealing areas, which
predominantly appear in inner-city African American areas, as highcrime areas for purposes of stopping a citizen.108 Whren v. United

101. See Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in
the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 721, 722 nn. 1–2 (2004) (discussing multiple surveys
conducted on the topic of selective enforcement of laws).
102. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o
Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 Fla.
L. Rev. 341, 343–44 (2003).
103. Id. at 344.
104. See List of Available Quick Tables for the National Survey on Drug Use and
Health, 2011, Nat’l Addiction & HIV Data Archive Program,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/quicktables/quickconfig.do?34481-0001_all
[https://perma.cc/QBQ2-SQ3R] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
105. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 257, 271–72 (2009).
106. See id. at 272 for a chart depicting drug arrests using data from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
107. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
108. Id. at 124; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the
Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas,” 63 Hastings L. J.

1276

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4
A Reform to Police Department Hiring

States,109 decided in 1996, allows officers to justify traffic stops for minor
infractions, even if the stop is pretextual and based on race.110 The curtilage doctrine, which protects the area immediately surrounding a
home,111 does not protect the hallway of an apartment.112 The doctrine
means that courts often protect affluent communities, where houses are
the typical dwellings, but do little to protect inner-city areas, low-income areas, and areas populated by people of color, where apartments
are the more common dwellings.113
The difficulty in effectively tracking police officers in regard to racial profiling and bias comes from the lack of internal enforcement and
investigation of these complaints. It is further complicated by judicial
protections for officers, such as those seen in Wardlow and Whren. The
ideal legislation would ensure reporting of police officers who employ
racial profiling and biased tactics when making stops and arrests.
Despite judicial protection, many of these policies still create unfair burdens on communities of color and harm police-community relations.
This system should at least work to eradicate those instances of racial
profiling that are explicitly unconstitutional. While a more robust system may require a changing of jurisprudence to eliminate a majority of
racial profiling, this is ultimately beyond the scope of this Note.

II. The Challenges of Preventing Hiring Officers with
Poor History
The status quo, which does little to prevent police departments
from hiring demonstrably unqualified officers such as Timothy
Loehmann, Sean Sullivan, or Eddie Boyd III, must be changed. That
much is clear. Public support for police officers and the idea that police
control and accountability in any form is anti-police make it difficult to
broach these subjects without eliciting significant criticism. But police
officers should be as qualified as current statutes and jurisprudence allow to serve and protect communities. Valiant efforts, such as the House
and Senate bills from the 1990s, have been attempted, but few have
brought about any significant change because of these steep barriers.

179, 217 (discussing the correlation between high crime areas and
communities of color).
109. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
110. Id. at 812–13.
111. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
112. Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage
Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 Geo. Mason C. R. L.J. 297,
310 (2005).
113. Id. at 310–12.
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Some barriers fall under general issues in employment law, such as
confidentiality agreements signed in the wake of termination or resignation and police unions, which often provide substantial support for
bad police officers. Further, despite a majority of states having some
form of decertification for officers, the decertification is not uniform and
might not capture all of what this Note defines as police misconduct.
Other barriers take the form of widespread cultural issues in police departments and the infamous “Blue Wall of Silence.” Still further barriers to systemic national change arise due to the issues inherent in federalism and the decentralization of police departments. Each of these
delicate issues must be dealt with in order to enact programs that would
give police departments the tools necessary to hire the best applicants.
A. Confidentiality Agreements

Confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements, either signed during
termination or resignation proceedings or enacted by state and local
law, provide ample protection for police officers. In many states, police
officers enjoy broad protections for their personnel files, and both
legislatures and the judicial system have broadened the definition of
personnel files to include disciplinary matters. Any serious program designed to prevent the hiring of previously-disciplined officers or officers
who have committed crimes or constitutional violations needs to be able
to breach these confidential personnel files.
In California, for example, the penal code gives broad confidentiality protections to police officers personnel files.114 Personnel files
consist of employment history, records of investigation or complaints
regarding the officer that stem from the officer’s official duties, and
departmental discipline.115 The only way to acquire the personnel record
of a police officer in California is during litigation or if either the Attorney General, or a district attorney, commence an investigation into
the officer’s actions.116 Theoretically, each of these types of information
could demonstrate an officer’s unfitness for duty. But with relatively
little means for acquiring the police officer’s personnel record, a lone
police department would be unable to determine whether it wished to
hire the officer.
Court decisions also affect whether personnel records are discoverable. In Montgomery County v. Shropshire,117 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland ruled that internal investigations of two officers were con-

114. Cal. Penal Code § 832.7 (2004).
115. Id. § 832.8.
116. Id. § 832.7.
117. 23 A.3d 205 (Md. 2011).
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sidered personnel records, rather than investigations.118 A complaint
had been filed alleging that the officers had conducted themselves improperly during the investigation of a traffic accident.119 The internal
investigation found that the officers had not committed any administrative violations.120 In response, the Montgomery County Inspector
General requested the records of the officers and of the internal affairs
investigation.121 Labeling the internal investigations as personnel records exempted them from disclosure requirements under the Maryland
Public Information Act.122 The court reasoned that there was a “significant public interest in preserving the confidentiality of internal police
investigations both in promoting cooperation by civilian witnesses and
police officers.”123 This created an even more stringent regime than that
of California; in Maryland, the court said that internal investigations
do not have to be disclosed to county Inspectors General. If the investigating arm of the county government is unable to access records of internal investigations, then there is little hope of police departments
acquiring them when screening applicants either.
There is a distinction between what California law and Maryland
courts say and the issue discussed here. The legislation proposed would
condition the release of this information on self-reporting, rather than
any investigatory powers. The California statute and, more narrowly,
Shropshire stand for preventing the release of this internal information
to the public. The Department of Justice would be the only entity able
to see all of the information contained in the database created by this
legislation. Police departments would only have access insofar as they
would be conducting background investigations on specific officers. The
police departments would not have carte blanche to view all information in the database and thus the database should be outside any concerns raised in the California statute and in Shropshire.
B. Police Unions, Police Culture, and the “Blue Wall of Silence”

Police unions are politically powerful and highly influential in communities around the country. They work hard to protect officers who
engage in police misconduct. Police unions often hold such enormous
sway because of the importance of police to the community. Police unions, though, have gone far beyond the simple collective bargaining and
employment protections offered by other unions. Instead, police unions
118. Id. at 218.
119. Id. at 207.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 208.
122. Id. at 207.
123. Id. at 216.
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have used their power to influence state and local politicians to enact
laws that help to cover up evidence of police misconduct.
In early 2016, The Guardian combed extensively through hacked
files belonging to the Fraternal Order of Police, the nation’s largest police union.124 The nearly 2.5 gigabytes of leaked files contained agreements between cities and local branches of the Fraternal Order of
Police.125 The hacks showed that cities all across the United States were
inserting provisions into the agreements that protected police officers
who engaged in misconduct.126 In a large number of contracts, there
were provisions that allowed for, or required, the destruction of “records
of civilian complaints, departmental investigations, or disciplinary actions after a negotiated period of time.”127 In some instances, that period
of time was as little as a few months.128
The “Blue Wall of Silence” is heavily intertwined with police union
policies. The police code of silence has been long observed in academia,
news, and court opinions as a significant barrier to holding police officers accountable for their actions.129 Officers often face serious and
brutal consequences from other officers if they break the code.130 In the
past, cooperating officers have lost their careers, had their property destroyed, and have feared for their lives.131
There is further evidence that unions often explicitly condone the
“Blue Wall of Silence” and implicitly condone the retaliation that cooperating officers receive. In the wake of the killing of Laquan McDonald
in Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel formed a police accountability task
force.132 The task force concluded that “the police unions and the City
124. George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary
Records Will Be Kept Secret, Guardian (Feb. 7, 2016, 7:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-filescontain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret [https://perma.
cc/88HS-AA2D].
125. Id.
126. Id. Protections include “slow[ing] down misconduct investigations,
prevent[ing] public access to complaints and disciplinary records, and
enabl[ing] the destruction of complaints and disciplinary records after a
negotiated period of time. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Chin & Wells, supra note 73, at 238–40 nn.16–22.
130. See id. at 256–61 (discussing officer retaliation in general and with specificity
in the accompanying footnotes).
131. Id. at 242–43 n.25.
132. Clarence Page, Cleaning Up a Police Culture of Cover-up, Chi. Trib. (Apr.
15, 2016, 12:21 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/page/
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have essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”133 This
is not limited to just Chicago. Jurisdictions around the country have
made it easier for unions to protect officers behind the “Blue Wall of
Silence.”134 Often, collective bargaining agreements have provisions that
allow for a grace period—an “interrogation buffer”—before interviews
take place, which ostensibly gives police departments the ability to cooperate on responses to investigations.135
Police department culture is also toxic, protecting officers from
public scrutiny and liability. Mayor Emanuel created the above-mentioned Chicago police accountability taskforce after it came to light that
the police department had worked to cover up any evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Officer Jason Van Dyke.136 Officer Van Dyke told
investigators that he feared for his life.137 Officers who witnessed Van
Dyke shoot and kill McDonald told investigators, under oath, that Officer Van Dyke acted in self-defense when he shot Laquan McDonald,
because McDonald “had moved menacingly toward [Van Dyke] with a
knife.”138 Command-level officials in the police department also agreed
that Officer Van Dyke acted reasonably.139 Contrary to the police department’s public statements, video evidence shows that Laquan

ct-page-police-racism-laquan-emanuel-task-force-perspec-0417-jm-20160415story.html [https://perma.cc/TQT2-XCPX].
133. Police Accountability Task Force, Recommendations for
Reform: Restoring Trust Between the Chicago Police and the
Communities They Serve 14 (2016).
134. See Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police
Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of
Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 207–08 (2005) (discussing a typical
provision in Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights that “enshrine[s] in law
the previously illegal blue wall of silence . . . .”).
135. Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence:
How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Chi.
Legal F. 213, 220 (2016).
136. Page, supra note 132; see also Mitch Smith & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 7
Chicago Officers Face Firing Over Laquan McDonald Cover-Up, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/laquanmcdonald-chicago-police.html [https://perma.cc/4VFB-F7FC]; Jeremy
Gorner, et al., Top Police Brass Defended Laquan McDonald Shooting After
Seeing Video, Records Show, Chi. Trib. (Dec. 23, 2016, 6:55 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-laquan-mcdonaldshooting-inspector-general-report-met-20161222-story.html [https://perma.
cc/K57R-JQMA].
137. Gorner, supra note 136.
138. Smith & Oppel, supra note 136.
139. Gorner, supra note 136.
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McDonald was stumbling away from officers when Van Dyke fired his
gun sixteen times, killing the Chicago youth.140
While police unions have worked tirelessly to institute police-friendly policies at the state and local level, they have worked just as tirelessly
to prevent reforms that would have a positive effect on police-community relations. Many states have a system whereby officers who commit misconduct can be decertified or have their licenses revoked.141 In
those states that do not have a certification system, it is largely due to
the efforts of police unions blocking accountability reforms.142 Other
common-sense reforms that police unions have blocked include the use
of body cameras, nametags, and more thorough reports and documentation of racial profiling, bias, and excessive use of force.143 Further, police unions consistently oppose the oversight power of civilian review
boards.144
In most other jobs, background investigations would uncover instances of law-breaking and misconduct allegations from supervisors
and coworkers. But in the police department context, the “Blue Wall
of Silence” effectively covers up evidence of misbehaving officers. These
lax laws and policies concerning background investigation should not
be applied to law enforcement officers sworn to protect and serve our
communities. Thus, the legislation should enable the piercing of this
thick veil of secrecy propagated by police unions and local governments.
C. Certification and Licensure

Many occupations—namely, doctors, airline pilots, and lawyers—
have licenses or certifications. In the event of misconduct or malpractice, professionals in these occupations often face the risk of being decertified or stripped of their licenses. This is so the government or independent boards in charge of regulating those professions uphold the integrity and ensure that honest, ethical, and competent people are
140. Page, supra note 132.
141. See infra Section II.C.
142. Revocation, supra note 39, at 571.
143. James Surowiecki, Why Are Police Unions Blocking Reform?, New Yorker
(Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/19/whyare-police-unions-blocking-reform [https://perma.cc/A2DM-25K3].
144. Id. In Cleveland, Steve Loomis, the president of the local police union, serves
on the Cleveland Community Police Commission. Various organizations
have called on Loomis to resign because of his impartiality and tendency to
undermine the work of the Cleveland Community Police Commission in the
media. Sam Allard, Loomis Will Not Resign from Community Police
Commission, Cleveland Scene (Jan. 28, 2016, 4:54 PM), http://
www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2016/10/18/vocal-demands
-call-for-removal-of-steve-loomis-from-cleveland-police-commission [https://
perma.cc/AT9L-5SXQ].
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employed in these fields. For law enforcement officers, a majority of
states do offer certification or licensure. The problems lie in consistency,
enforcement, the power of state decertification boards, and the lack of
efficacy across state borders.
1. Consistency

Forty-three states have adopted some form of decertification as a
penalty for committing various forms of misconduct or criminal activity.145 Each state maintains a similar construction for its decertification
regime. Peace Officer Standards and Training Commissions are statecreated entities that are in charge of defining the criteria for serving as
a law enforcement officer.146 Each state also provides for sanctions short
of decertification.147 The similarities end there, however, as many states
have different criteria for law enforcement officer certification.
Of the states that do have a decertification process, there is little
consistency in the reasons that will lead to decertification. The states
can be categorized into two different tiers. In the first tier are the states
that decertify officers for felony and, in some states, misdemeanor convictions.148 That is clearly a good first step; officers should not be allowed to serve after felony convictions. But the states in the first tier
stop at felony and misdemeanor convictions instead of also including
administrative adjudications and misconduct.149 Further, decertification
in those states that require a conviction provides a large amount of discretion to prosecutors, who may or may not pursue charges against an
officer.150
In the second tier are those states that further include administrative hearings and adjudications by administrative law judges as a
basis for decertification.151 This is in addition to decertification as a
result of criminal convictions.152 In this tier, there exists a broad spectrum of administrative charges and disciplinary infractions that lead to
administrative decertification. In some states, decertification follows
from general “conduct unbecoming a law enforcement officer” or “act[s]

145. Revocation, supra note 39, at 542.
146. Id. at 542–43.
147. Id. at 544.
148. Model Law, supra note 39, at 150–51.
149. Id. at 151.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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committed . . . under color of law that involve[] moral turpitude.”153 In
others, decertification follows from more specific infractions, such as
excessive use of force or perjury.154
Intertwined in both of the tiers are those states that pursue decertification as a result of officer termination for good cause or resignation
in lieu of termination for good cause.155 This can provide ample protection against hiring unfit officers by catching those who have a pattern
or history of misconduct that does not rise to the level of administrative
adjudications. The weakness in this policy, though, is when an officer
is decertified for a good-cause termination resulting from inability to
get along with other officers.156 In other words, an officer who is pretextually fired, possibly for breaching the “Blue Wall of Silence,” can
be subject to decertification for acting contrary to the union or his or
her commanding officer.
Resignation is also viewed differently by states that have decertification boards. In those states that have termination for good cause as
a basis for decertification, some also include provisions allowing for decertification if an officer resigns in the face of imminent investigation
into conduct that could lead to termination for good cause.157 In Washington, a proposed law would have allowed the state Peace Officers
Standards and Training Commission to decertify officers who resigned
when conduct could have led to termination, whether the conduct had
been discovered by supervisors or not.158 It is especially important to
include resignation in the face of imminent investigation or discipline
because police departments oftentimes sign confidentiality agreements
so that they do not have to engage in lengthy and expensive hearings
and investigations.159 This lack of consistency between the states necessitates finding a common, minimum standard for officer revocation.
2. Power of State Boards

The states that do have state organizations for decertification of officers also differ in the boards’ power to act unilaterally. In some states,
the state board can act absent local departmental action to revoke or

153. Id. For examples of states that have this statutory language, see id. at 151
nn.12 & 14.
154. Id. at 152.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 152–53.
157. Revocation, supra note 39, at 560.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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decertify an officer for misconduct.160 In some states, the board must
wait for the local department to terminate or begin termination proceedings before the board can revoke or decertify an officer.161 In a proposed statute, a separate state civil service board has the power to overturn a local department’s decision.162 Thus, even if a police chief or
sheriff would like to terminate an officer for good cause, the civil service
board can have a hearing, and the officer, represented by union counsel,
can be reinstated to his or her position. In those states, the state decertification board cannot take any action, even if the officer was justifiably
terminated in the first place.163 This can have the effect of a police chief
deciding not to terminate an officer or even start disciplinary proceedings. The chief, hoping to save money, would rather allow the officer to resign, than spend the time and resources investigating, holding
hearings, and litigating before the state board only to have to rehire
the officer and give him or her back pay.164 Thus, while this system
should include protections for officers in the event of unjust termination, it should also make sure that the reasonable and correct final
decisions of police departments are upheld.
3. Enforcement

Issues also arise in enforcement of decertification. Even when a state
has provisions in place to decertify law enforcement officers who commit
misconduct, officers may not be decertified for their misconduct. In
Carney v. White,165 an officer had been fired from a Wisconsin police
department for trading, and offering to trade, leniency in traffic tickets
for sexual favors.166 After the first police department fired him, he ac-

160. Id. at 558.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 558–59.
163. Id. Civil service boards are often criticized as pro-police and pro-union. One
example of an officer reinstated after justifiable termination occurred in
Braintree, Massachusetts. Officer James Kelleher was fired from his position
as a police officer after he and his girlfriend assaulted his then-wife. After the
police department went through the lengthy process of terminating him, the
civil service commission overturned that decision and reinstated him with
back pay. See David Armstrong, Second Chance for Bad Cops: Chiefs Say
Civil Service Thwarts Discipline, Bos. Globe (May 21, 2000), http://
cache.boston.com/globe/metro/packages/civil_service/part1.htm [https://
perma.cc/FT7K-KCBK] (discussing James Kelleher and the problem with
the civil service commissions in Massachusetts).
164. Revocation, supra note 39, at 599.
165. 843 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
166. Id. at 478.
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quired employment with another Wisconsin police department.167 The
second police department later fired him, and his victims sued the city
when he committed the same form of misconduct.168 While misconduct
did lead to decertification in this instance, the state board was not required to decertify in the case of termination; instead, the state board
allowed local police departments discretion in deciding whether to conduct background investigations or whether to hire an officer.169
Similarly, in Doe v. Wright,170 a police officer resigned after attempting to exchange leniency in traffic citations for sexual favors.171
His original police department followed statutory requirements when it
reported his resignation to the state board.172 But because Arkansas law
at the time did not require police departments to include information
as to why the officer resigned, he was not decertified.173 When he subsequently secured employment at a new police department, he was caught
engaging in the same misconduct and fired.174 Arkansas later amended
its laws to require the disclosure of information as to why an officer
resigned.175
The cases of White and Wright are not anomalous. Rather, they are
compounded by the fact that, as discussed previously, prosecutors have
substantial discretion in determining whether to pursue charges against
a police officer. In that sense, a decertification program that relies solely
on convictions would let officers who engage in other forms of misconduct, or in criminal activity that a prosecutor does not pursue, slip
through the cracks. As discussed above, police unions and the “Blue
Wall of Silence” provide ample protections for officers accused of misconduct. This often leads to situations like that of Officer Van Dyke,
where nearly a year passed before the prosecutor formally charged him
with a crime.176 In that time, he had not been under any significant investigation by the Chicago Police Department which would have risen
to the level of decertification.177 An officer in Van Dyke’s position, then,
167. Id.
168. Id. at 478–79, 465.
169. Revocation, supra note 39, at 561.
170. 82 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1996).
171. Id. at 267.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Revocation, supra note 39, at 561.
176. Gorner, supra note 136.
177. In Illinois, the board may not certify any officer who has been convicted of
a felony. 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 705/6.1(a) (2013). Officer Van Dyke was
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could have resigned and taken a position as a police officer in another
jurisdiction.
4. Lack of Efficacy Across Borders

Finally, state governments control certifications of law enforcement
officers within their borders. Each state controls the requirements for
officer certification and controls the bases for decertification. This has
the effect of creating vastly different systems from one state to the next.
Decertifying conduct in one state may not rise to the level of decertification in another state. Thus, an officer like Sean Sullivan, who is
fired and who would lose his certification in most states, is able to cross
state borders to work as a police chief. While the cases of Wright and
White above illustrate this situation in the context of intrastate police
departments, police departments that wish to hire applicants who previously worked out of state have little means to discover previous misconduct.
The case that led James T. Moore, Commissioner of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, to testify in support of the Law
Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act
of 1996 involved an officer doing exactly this. In West Palm Beach
County, Florida, two police officers engaged in the use of deadly force,
killing Robert Jewett.178 One of the officers came from Tennessee after
resigning from a police department for former misconduct.179 In the investigation into Jewett’s death, it came to light that the officer from
Tennessee had explicitly asked the Chattanooga police department not
to report that he was forced to resign.180 Under Tennessee law at the
time, a suspension or termination was enough for the state board to decertify an officer.181 But because he resigned and pledged to move to
Florida to continue his law enforcement career, his new police department was unaware of his past misconduct.182 In his testimony, Commissioner Moore said of Jewett’s death: “I am confident that had [his]
record[] been known when [he] applied for [his] police job[], [he] would
have never been hired. Had this happened, Mr. Jewett might be alive
not indicted until over a year after the shooting. Steve Schmadeke, Chicago
Cop Indicted on 6 Murder Counts in Laquan McDonald Slaying, Chi. Trib.
(Dec. 16, 2015, 8:32 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-jason-van-dyke-indicted-laquan-mcdonald-met-20151216-story.
html [https://perma.cc/SFS5-VN96].
178. Revocation, supra note 39, at 561.
179. Id. at 562.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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today.”183 A system that works both interstate and intrastate is desperately needed to prevent tragic events like the killing of Robert Jewett.
D. Federalism and the Decentralization of Police Departments

The federal government does not have general police powers. Many
Supreme Court cases speak to the exclusive power of state governments
to regulate police departments.184 Police power is almost exclusively in
the hands of state governments under the Tenth Amendment. Some
states take this a step further; they have decentralized their police functions to the point that local police departments often set their own internal hiring and qualification policies.185 This presents genuine challenges with regard to implementing effective policies to prevent the
hiring of problem officers.
But police power and criminal activity, as well as police accountability, have been increasingly subject to dual enforcement from the
federal government. And in the past, the Supreme Court has indicated
a willingness to uphold federal police accountability laws if enacted
through the proper channels.186 Federal courts oversee and ensure enforcement with the federal government reforms when the Department
of Justice negotiates consent decrees with local police departments
found to be engaging in unconstitutional practices under 34 U.S.C. §
12601.187 Other federal crime bills, including the Omnibus Crime

183. Police Officers’ Rights and Benefits, supra note 29, at 175 (prepared
statement of James T. Moore, Comm’r, Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local . . . Indeed, [there is] no better example of the police power,
which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that the states
“historically have been sovereign” in the field of law enforcement).
185. As discussed above, see supra Section II.C.3., some states have similar
systems to Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, despite having a Peace Officer
Standards and Training Commission, the law allows for local police
departments to decide whether to hire an officer or whether to conduct a
background investigation. Such decentralization causes issues such as those
seen in Carney v. White. See supra notes 165–168 and accompanying text;
Revocation, supra note 39, at 561.
186. In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court invalidated only the civil
remedy included in the Violence Against Women Act, but indicated a
willingness to uphold the rest of the act. 529 U.S. at 627. And, in United
States v. Lopez, the Court explicitly stated that federal criminal laws could
be upheld under the Commerce Clause as long as they fall into one of three
categories. 514 U.S. at 558.
187. See supra Section I.C.
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Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,188 the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,189 and the Gun-Free Schools Act of
1994,190 are still good law despite states being the main arbiters of police
power and criminal laws.
E. Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights

Many of the policies supported by local police unions and promulgated by local governments can be traced to a single, highly effective
barrier to police accountability. Fourteen states currently have enacted
a Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBoR”) to protect the
due process of officers during internal investigations.191 Still more states
and localities have adopted, as part of collective bargaining agreements,
similar protections afforded by the LEOBoRs in those fourteen states.192
Protections include longer waiting periods for the commencement of an
investigation, interviews conducted only by fellow law enforcement officers, and notice of investigation provided to both the law enforcement
officer and his or her union representative.193 In all cases, officers are afforded more rights than the suspects that they interrogate and investigate on a daily basis.194 These provisions directly shield officers from accountability by providing them with substantial leniency during investigations. While LEOBoRs generally only apply in those instances
where an officer is under internal investigation, in most cases an internal investigation is the only one an officer will face for alleged
misconduct.195 While not necessarily a direct impediment to decertification—LEOBoRs do not include provisions denying states the ability to
decertify officers—the LEOBoRs are impediments to the investigatory
188. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 10101 et
seq. (2017)).
189. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq. (2017)).
190. 20 U.S.C. § 7961 (2015).
191. Eli Hager, Blue Shield: Did You Know Police Have Their Own Bill of
Rights?, Marshall Project (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield#.0Qyqq9ce6 [https://perma.cc/3BD94XXR]. The fourteen states are California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
192. Keenan & Walker, supra note 134, at 185–86.
193. Id. at 203–41 (discussing typical provisions of LEOBoRs).
194. Other provisions not afforded to suspects include limits on duration of
interviews, protections against harassing or threatening during interrogation,
and limits on the number of interrogators present during an interview. Id.
195. Id. at 207–10 (discussing LEOBoR provisions dealing with formal
investigations, as opposed to informal inquiries).
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powers of police departments. Thus, police departments are more likely
to allow the officer to resign than to spend the time and resources that
comes with these investigations. And this can have the effect of shielding the officer from decertification.
F. The Inadequacy of Alternative Remedies

There are several remedies currently available for deterring police
officers from committing misconduct. These other remedies, however,
are entirely inadequate at dealing with problem officers acquiring new
positions. The exclusionary rule is now subject to a balancing test,
meaning that even if officers do commit unconstitutional searches and
seizures, the evidence may still be admitted at trial.196 Consent decrees
established under 34 U.S.C. § 12601 have had modest successes in
changing institutional policies, but do not deter individual officers from
unconstitutional conduct.197 Section 1983 actions may provide some deterrence, but jury bias in favor of the officers and the Supreme Court’s
expansion of qualified immunity has made it increasingly difficult to
hold officers accountable.198 Criminal prosecutions of law enforcement
officers also do not provide much deterrence. Prosecutors, who can only
effectively carry out their duties with the help of police officers, are
reluctant to bring criminal charges.199 And, as in 1983 actions, jury bias
favors officers, making it very difficult to prosecute officers successfully.200 Internal investigations also rarely hold officers accountable for
their actions.201 Thus, a new remedy is required that will effectively deter officers from committing crimes and misconduct.

III. A Cooperative Federalism Solution
Cooperative federalism is a regulatory regime in which the federal
government enacts a law, and then “invite[s] state agencies to super196. See supra note 94.
197. See Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments
from DOJ Reforms, In These Times (June 21, 2016), http://
inthesetimes.com/features/police-killings-union-contracts.html [https://
perma.cc/8XAU-FU9F] (discussing the modest successes, but also the
failings of consent decrees); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism
and Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police
Accountability, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 351, 376 (2011) (pointing out the lack of a
“mechanism to guarantee that the reforms implemented under the [consent
decree] will continue”).
198. Alternative Remedies, supra note 39, at 56–59.
199. Id. at 59–60.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 60–64.
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intend [the] federal law.”202 It is commonly characterized as the federal
government enacting federal minimum standards, which are then implemented by state agencies.203 Generally, the law allows for wide discretion; states can enact the minimum standards, can create more stringent standards, or, in some cases, can receive federal exemption from
the minimum standards.204 Cooperative federalism allows states to tailor
the minimum standards to local conditions within the state.205 Cooperative federalism reflects the federal government’s understanding that
not all states are the same, and thus it allows each state latitude to determine which policy works best for that state.
One of the most well-known cooperative federalism regimes is the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) enforcement of air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act. Passed using the Commerce Clause,
the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to promulgate minimum standards
for ambient air quality of different environmental air pollutants.206 Once
those standards are created, the states must submit for EPA approval
implementation plans that meet, but may exceed, the minimum standards.207 A state may opt out and allow the EPA to create and implement
a federal plan for the state.208 If a state fails to submit a plan for
approval, or if a state fails to come into compliance with its EPA-approved plan, then the EPA can sanction the state in a number of
ways.209 The EPA can also sanction certain parts of states, rather than
the entire state, if the parts are designated as “non-attainment areas.”210
Thus, the Clean Air Act implements many of the hallmarks of a cooperative federalism regime: the federal government promulgates minimum
standards; the state chooses to adopt or modify the minimum standards
subject to approval by the federal government; and, the federal government does not coerce, but merely persuades states to adopt and enforce
the regime.
Clearly, the problem of police departments hiring officers who have
committed crimes, have been fired for misconduct, or have resigned in
202. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1695 (2001).
203. Id. at 1696.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1698.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).
207. Id. §§ 7410, 7416.
208. Id. § 7410(c).
209. The federal government may withhold certain amounts of transportation
funding. Id. §§ 7506(c)(1), (c)(2). The EPA can also compel states by
withholding permits for new sources of air pollutants. Id. § 7503(a)(4). For
other sanctions under the Clean Air Act, see id. § 7509.
210. See id. § 7509.
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the face of imminent discipline has little to do with the environment.
But the structure of the cooperative federalism regime implemented under the Clean Air Act provides a blueprint for implementing necessary
reforms in police department hiring processes. One could envision a law,
passed using Congressional Spending Power rather than the Commerce
Clause, in which Congress gives power to the Department of Justice to
promulgate minimum standards for law enforcement officer certification
and decertification. The Department of Justice would also be responsible for creating a database—and persuading the state and local police
departments to self-report—that tracks only those officers who have
been decertified. The Department of Justice could then implement these
standards in a manner similar to how the EPA implements the Clean
Air Act. Under the legislation, states would be required to submit plans
to the Department of Justice for approval. Once approved, the Department of Justice would give states a certain period of time to implement
and begin enforcing the plans. If certain states or areas decline to implement the minimum standards, the Department of Justice would have
the power to implement a federal plan. If certain states or areas refuse
or shirk their responsibilities under the Department of Justice approved
plans, then the Department of Justice would be authorized to sanction
the states.
In constructing a cooperative federalism regime, the Department of
Justice should enact fairly strict minimum standards for certification
and decertification. The Department of Justice would also be tasked
with creating a database to track officers who have been decertified
pursuant to the minimum standards. It should allow a state, through
its agencies, to implement the standards in a way that most benefits
the state. The legislation would also include incentives and sanctions
that would persuade state governments to comply with the law.
Congress would give protections to officers so that it might be more
palatable to officer unions and would assuage due process concerns. The
legislation would also need to include a description of the relevant constitutional powers that Congress relies on to implement the law. Part
III of this Note aims to create legislation and minimum standards that
would satisfy all of these requirements.
A. Constitutional Powers and Challenges

Under the Clean Air Act, Congress presented its findings in a way
that spoke to the Clean Air Act’s constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause. Pollution, Congress said, contributes to problems with
transportation, crops, public health, and welfare. This has allowed the
EPA’s enforcement regime under the Clean Air Act to survive

1292

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4
A Reform to Police Department Hiring

constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce Clause in federal court.211
Additionally, the Clean Air Act has survived a non-delegation doctrine
challenge212 and a Tenth Amendment challenge.213 Here, Congress could
enact this legislation pursuant to the Spending Power. The main challenges to the legislation would come in the forms of overreach under
the Spending Power, the non-delegation doctrine, and the anti-commandeering doctrine.
1. The Spending Power

Congressional spending power is based in the first clause of Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution. This clause gives Congress the “Power
To lay and collect Taxes . . . and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.”214 In South Dakota v. Dole,215 the
Supreme Court said that, implicit in the reading of this clause, is the
power to “attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”216 The
Court went on to place explicit limits on the spending power: (1) “the
exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare”; (2) the condition must be unambiguous, “enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly”; (3) the condition must be related “to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs”; and,
(4) the condition must be otherwise constitutional.217 The Court stated
that the condition must not be unduly coercive.218 Additionally, in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,219 the Court
reaffirmed the necessity of Congress to make clear the conditions on
funding and held that the conditions must affect future funding.220 In
other words, Congress cannot use the spending power to take away
funding that a state was given previously.221

211. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981).
212. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
213. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310, 1314–15 (1977).
214. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
215. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
216. Id. at 206.
217. Id. at 207–08 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
218. Id. at 211.
219. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
220. Id. at 2606–07 (“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that
choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing
Medicaid funding.”)
221. Id.

1293

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4
A Reform to Police Department Hiring

Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is authorized to order other
agencies to withhold certain funding if an area is designated a non-attainment area.222 This funding is limited to nonessential funding only;
if the funding is needed for safety, public transit, or other explicitly
listed reasons, the Department of Transportation must (for safety) or
may (for the other reasons) approve grants or projects.223 Every year,
Congress appropriates substantial amounts of grant funds for state and
local police departments. Under this legislation, Congress would be able
to authorize the Department of Justice to withhold certain amounts of
grant funding through its Office of Justice Programs.224 Like the Clean
Air Act, essential funding would not be withheld.225
Grant funding for state and local law enforcement reached over $2.5
billion during fiscal year 2016.226 One source of “funding” that the Department of Justice could order to be withheld is the distribution of
arms and other technology that the Department of Defense is authorized to give to state and local police departments under the 1033 Program, which has distributed military equipment to 8,000 police departments in all fifty states as well as Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands since its inception in 1997.227 Another could
be grants through the Community Oriented Policing Services
(“COPS”) Program, which aims to advance community policing in local

222. See supra Part III.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b).
224. For a list of funding and grant projects for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and
2017, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2017 DOJ Program Plan,
https://www.grantsnet.justice.gov/programplan/html/Solicitations.htm
[https://perma.cc/4VUH-A5BS] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
225. While essential funding is not easily defined in this context, it could look
similar to the Clean Air Act, where funding is not withheld for explicitly
listed reasons, such as safety and public transportation. Here, essential
funding could, likewise, be safety spending that reaches a certain level
defined by the courts or Congress. One could imagine a scenario where
funding for armored vehicles could be withheld while funding for bullet proof
vests might be exempt from conditions.
226. Police Grants: What’s Being Federally Funded in 2016, PoliceOne.com
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.policeone.com/police-grants/articles/71130006police-grants-whats-being-federally-funded-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/GD5
H-935P].
227. Excess Federal Property, Just. Tech. Info. Ctr., https://justnet.org/
resources/Excess-Federal-Property.html [https://perma.cc/PGU9-MP8A]
(last visited Mar. 21, 2017); Law Enforcement Support Office, DEF.
LOGISTICS AGENCY http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutil
ization/LawEnforcement.aspx [https://perma.cc/7GQX-FAH6] (last visited
Mar. 21, 2017).
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and state law enforcement.228 The COPS Program has given state and
local police departments more than $14 billion since the program was
created in 1994, and each department that wishes to receive funding
must apply for the grant.229 Further, the Office of Justice Programs and
various other federal offices and departments provide more grant funding to state and local law enforcement.
As the federal government gives many state and local police departments grants and funding which are appropriated year after year—and
applied for by those departments each year—conditioning the grants
on the implementation of these standards would not run afoul of South
Dakota v. Dole or NFIB v. Sebelius.230 The funding is tied to the general
welfare; the COPS Program is designed to enhance community policing,231 the 1033 Program is designed to provide equipment officers in
the field,232 and many of the other grants and funding are directly linked
to general public safety measures.233 It would be simple enough to articulate explicitly what a state must do in order to comply with the legislation, thus complying with the unambiguity requirement. Additionally,
the funding is related “to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs”; Congress does have an interest in ensuring that
the officers that are hired through the COPS Program and the officers
that use the arms and technology through the 1033 Program act in a
constitutional manner. Congress also has an interest in ensuring that
the money that goes toward improving police-community relations is
given to those departments that have hired offices which put the departments in the best possible position to implement much needed reforms. Thus, this legislation would have a strong argument for constitutionality under Congress’s Spending Power.

228. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, About, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, https://cops.usdoj.gov/about [https://perma.cc/2JT4-VXSF] (last
visited Mar. 21, 2017).
229. Id.
230. The type of grants and the exact amount conditioned on implementation of
this system would need to be calculated to avoid the Supreme Court labeling
the conditions “unduly coercive.” In South Dakota v. Dole, because South
Dakota would only lose 5 percent of funding due to non-compliance, the
Supreme Court found that the requirement was not coercive. 483 U.S. 203,
211–12 (1987). Here, the calculation would involve more, as it would have
to take into account direct funding of state and local police departments by
the federal government, as well as funding given to the state governments
earmarked for general law enforcement funding.
231. About, supra note 228.
232. Excess Federal Property, supra note 227.
233. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 224.
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2. Challenges

Besides a challenge to this system under congressional spending
power, the potential legislation could also face challenges under the nondelegation and anti-commandeering doctrines. Under Article I, Section
1 of the Constitution, “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.”234 The Supreme Court has
read this to mean that Congress may not delegate legislative duties to
other branches of government.235 In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States,236 the Supreme Court held that Congress may delegate powers
to the executive branch if Congress “shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized . . . [act]
is directed to conform.”237
In Whitman v. American Trucking Association,238 the Supreme
Court applied the intelligible principle requirements to the Clean Air
Act. At issue in that case was whether the Clean Air Act was a constitutional delegation of powers by Congress to the EPA.239 The Court
held that, as long as the legislation contained an “intelligible principle”
that directed the agency, it was not an unconstitutional delegation of
power.240 In that case, the Clean Air Act included an intelligible principle because it requires the “EPA to set air quality standards at the
‘requisite’ level, that is, not lower or higher than is necessary,” and does
not need to specify exact levels.241 Here, the proposed legislation could
include a provision that requires the Department of Justice to set minimum qualifications for decertification that are not higher or lower than
necessary to prevent police departments from hiring officers who have
committed the police misconduct defined in Part I above.
Another major challenge to this legislation could come in the form
of an anti-commandeering challenge. Under the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution, Congress many not enact legislation that “commandeers” a state’s legislative or executive branch to carry out federal
regulation.242 In New York v. United States, the seminal case on the
234. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
235. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
236. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
237. Id. at 409; Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
238. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
239. Id. at 472–73.
240. Id. at 473–76.
241. Id. at 475–76.
242. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (“As an initial matter,
Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
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anti-commandeering doctrine, the Supreme Court took issue with a
federal law which compelled state governments to establish ownership
of radioactive waste produced within that state’s borders. 243 In Printz
v. United States,244 the Supreme Court ruled invalid a provision in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which required state law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on potential gun
buyers because it compelled state officials to participate in a federal
regulatory scheme.245
In New York v. United States, however, the Court made clear that
Congress still had the power to encourage state governments to enact
federal regulatory programs.246 Congress, the Court said, has two means
by which it can do so in a constitutional manner. First, Congress can
use the spending power to persuade state governments to enact federal
programs.247 Second, Congress can “offer States the choice of regulating
that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation.”248 As discussed in Part III.A.1, this legislation could be tailored so as to be constitutional under the Spending
Power. And the legislation would be constructed like the Clean Air Act,
with federal enforcement in those areas where states cannot, or will not,
enact the minimum standards.
The intelligible principle seems to be a fairly lenient standard; in
Whitman, the Court could only point to two cases in which the Court
held invalid delegation legislation.249 While Justice Thomas has since
criticized the leniency of the “intelligible principle” standard, it remains
good law today.250 The legislation here simply needs to include the manner in which the Department of Justice must act, set out in precise and
unambiguous terms. In that way, the legislation would likely survive a
challenge under the non-delegation doctrine. Further, because the legislation will be designed to persuade, and not compel state and local
program.’” (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))).
243. See id. at 177–80 (discussing the unconstitutionality of the “take title”
provision).
244. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
245. Id. at 933–34.
246. New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68 (discussing Congress’s power to encourage
state governments to enact federal regulations).
247. Id. at 167.
248. Id.
249. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (compiling cases in which the Supreme
Court has undertaken an “intelligible principle” analysis).
250. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1245–55 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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law enforcement departments to participate, it will not run afoul of the
anti-commandeering doctrine.
B. The Legislation

Like the Clean Air Act, this legislation must be thorough. In its
nearly half century of existence, the Clean Air Act has been the subject
of many constitutional challenges. Today, it still stands as a cooperative
federalism regime that, not without criticism, has overseen many important reforms to United States environmental policy. Like the EPA and
the environment, the Department of Justice is an agency that is acutely
aware of the challenges facing police departments. As such, the Department of Justice is in the best position to create, and persuade compliance with, minimum standards for police officer certification and decertification. Fortunately, state mechanisms for enforcement are already
in place; forty-three states have some form of Peace Officer Standards
and Training Commission that could be the state liaison for the federal
regulatory scheme.251 When creating the legislation, Congress would
have to include provisions that give the Department of Justice power
to promulgate and persuade compliance with the standards, to create
and persuade compliance with the database, and to give the states the
leniency needed to survive constitutional challenge.
When Congress gave the EPA the power to promulgate minimum
air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, it did so by including
an “intelligible principle” to survive a non-delegation doctrine challenge. Congress instructed the EPA to promulgate these standards after
a notice and comment period,252 subject to review by an independent
scientific committee,253 and with the mandate that the standards must
be related to protecting public health.254 In crafting the legislation which
would authorize the Department of Justice to promulgate minimum
standards and create the database, Congress would need to include an
“intelligible principle.” Congress could do so by mandating that the
Department of Justice hold a notice and comment period for the proposed minimum standards. Congress could also require that the minimum standards be subject to review by an independent committee consisting of law enforcement professionals, academics, and other independent, qualified citizens. And Congress would need to include a provision requiring the minimum standards to be directly related to preventing police departments from hiring problem police officers.

251. See supra Section II.C.1.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).
253. Id. § 7409(d).
254. Id. § 7409(b).
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As for the database, Congress could create the legislation in the
mold of the proposed Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996. This time, however, Congress could
respond to many of the criticisms that prevented the bill from making
it out of committee.255 This version of the database should track only
those officers who have been decertified pursuant to the minimum
standards, rather than the employment history of all law enforcement
officers in the United States.256 It should include confidentiality provisions so that only the Department of Justice may access the database
and so that police departments can only have access after securing a
signed release of information from the police department applicant. As
discussed above, the problem of officers moving to a different jurisdiction is not confined to anecdotal accounts anymore; rather, the problem has become well known in the media as a widespread issue.257
Officers could be given notice of what information a police department
is sending to the database, and Congress could include an appeal provision for officers to contest the publishing of employment history in
the database.
Like the sanctions that allow the EPA both to withhold transportation funding and to order other departments to withhold funding, this
legislation could include sanctions, promulgated under the Spending
Power, both for the adoption of the minimum standards and for reporting to the database. Congress could give the Department of Justice the
authority to withhold certain funding and grants given to state and local police departments as part of the Office of Justice Programs.258 This
exercise of the Spending Power would be constitutional because: (1) it
aims to improve public safety and confidence in police departments; (2)
it would be enunciated in a clear and unambiguous manner, allowing
states the opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits of the regulatory
scheme; and (3) Congress has a particular interest in ensuring that its
grant funding is used by police departments and officers who have a
demonstrated ability to operate constitutionally. Further, the sanctions
must not be coercive, and Congress is in the best position to determine
whether the amount of funding that the Department of Justice can
withhold would rise to that level. Finally, the sanctions and conditions
would be forward looking because state and local police departments
apply for the grants each year, rather than receiving them over time.
255. See supra Introduction (discussing criticisms of the Law Enforcement and
Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996).
256. See infra Section III.C.
257. See supra Introduction (discussing Timothy Loehmann, Sean Sullivan, Eddie
Boyd III, Jason Van Dyke, Officer White, and Officer Wright); see also supra
Section II.C.4. (discussing the killing of Robert Jewett).
258. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 224.
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Congress could include incentives as well, such as funding appropriated for the legislation that will assist states in adopting this cooperative federalism regime. As for incentives for reporting to the database,
Congress should include a qualified immunity defense against defamation claims for police departments that, in good faith, report an officer’s
employment changes to the state created agency. This qualified immunity should also extend to the state agencies that report the final
determination of an officer’s status to the database.259 Finally, Congress
should not force states to adopt this regulatory regime in order to comply with the anti-commandeering doctrine. In those states and areas
where police departments do not comply with the minimum standards
or with the database, the Department of Justice should be authorized
to implement a federal program.
C. The Minimum Standards

In the ideal system, the federal minimum standards would cover
the requirements for both certification and decertification of police officers. The main focus of this Note, however, is attempting to prevent
police departments from hiring problematic applicants who have already served as police officers. As such, the minimum standards this
Note discusses will only cover the standards for decertifying an officer.
In a program such as this, the federal minimum standards would have
to be extensive, yet flexible, so that states can enact more stringent
standards. The main focus of Department of Justice should be on
creating the minimum standards by which police departments will know
when they should not hire a police officer.
To start, the Department of Justice should require the inclusion of
police officers in the minimum standards and database. Police officers
should include traditional state and local police, but also campus police
officers, elected law enforcement officials such as sheriffs, and transit
police.260 States should be free to include any other forms of law
enforcement officers they desire, including correctional officers, investigators for state bureaus of investigations, court appointed bailiffs, or
state border protections officers.261 The standard for when a law enforcement officer should be decertified should, at a minimum, include
when the officer commits felonies or certain misdemeanors, such as domestic abuse or other violent misdemeanors, burglary, perjury, property
theft, or unlawful possession of a weapon. It should also include firings
with good cause or resignations in the face of imminent discipline or
investigation, but only when resulting from misconduct as it relates to
the public. Thus, an officer who is fired with good cause because of
simple chemistry issues or who is pretextually fired for violating the
259. See Model Law, supra note 39, at 154 (discussing qualified immunity).
260. Id. at 150 (discussing law enforcement officers).
261. Id.
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“Blue Wall of Silence” should not be included in either the decertification regime or database. Rather, the firing or resignation must
come after instances of police brutality, perjury or corruption, or other
unconstitutional activities as determined by adjudications or
investigations carried out internally or by independent review boards.

Conclusion
Officers such as Timothy Loehmann, Sean Sullivan, and Eddie
Boyd III should never have been in positions to commit the misconduct
for which they have become known. Instead, these officers should have
been subject to decertification because of their clear unfitness to work
as law enforcement officers protecting and serving a community. Their
former employers should have reported the reasons for their change in
employment status to a state body. As a result, their new departments
should have been able to see their employment history and should have
been able to make the decision not to hire them. The system this Note
describes does not purport to be exhaustive. Yet, such a system would
provide a valuable starting point for enacting much needed reforms that
will ensure that police departments and officers afford people equal
protection of the law.
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